

Message Text

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S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 USNATO 5628

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR: TURKISH REVISIONS TO SECOND REPORT ON MOVEMENT
CONSTRAINTS

1. DURING NOV 20 MBFR WORKING GROUP MEETING (DETAILS SEPTTEL),
CHAIRMAN (SMITH) CIRCULATED REVISED TEXT OF SECTION 2 OF CHAPTER
VI OF WORKING GROUP'S SECOND REPORT ON MOVEMENT CONSTRAINTS
(AC/276-WP(73)16/1). TEXT REFLECTS TURKISH CHANGES WHICH IN
GENERAL REMOVE ANY REFERENCES TO TURKEY IN ANY AGREED CONSTRAINTS
AREA. TURKISH AND GREEK REPS ACCEPTED NEW TEXT AD REF TO CAPITALS,
WITH U.S. CONTINUING TO RESERVE ON OVERALL PAPER PENDING INSTRUCT-
IONS. IN EFFORT TO DISPOSE OF CONSTRAINTS PAPER IN TOTO AT
NEXT MBFR WG MEETING NOV 23, WE ARE TRANSMITTING TEXT OF NEW
REVISION. CAN WASHINGTON NOW AGREE TO ACCEPTANCE OF OVERALL
PAPER AS TECHNICAL STUDY?

BEGIN TEXT

SECTION 2 - SOUTHERN REGION

NATO REQUIREMENTS

123. TURKEY AND THE USSR SHARE A COMMON LAND FRONTIER, WHILE
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BOTH GREECE AND TURKEY SHARE A COMMON LAND FRONTIER WITH BULGARIA
WHOSE FORCES COULD BE REINFORCED BY SOVIET LAND FORCES TRANSITED
THROUGH ROMANIA FROM THE CARPATHIAN, ODESSA AND KIEV MILITARY
DISTRICTS. THE PURPOSE, THEREFORE, OF ANY MOVEMENT CONSTRAINTS

MEASURES WHICH NATO MIGHT WISH TO SEE IMPOSED ON FORCES LOCATED IN SOUTHERN USSR ARE THOSE SET OUT IN PARAGRAPH 102 ABOVE.

THE IMPLICATIONS TO NATO OF APPLYING MOVEMENT
CONSTRAINTS TO SOUTHERN USSR

124. THE SUB-GROUP RECOGNISES, AS ALREADY STATED IN CHAPTER III, PARAGRAPH 27, THAT IF AS A RESULT OF MBFR IN CENTRAL EUROPE, WITHDRAWN OR OTHER SOVIET FORCES ARE REDEPLOYED IN SOVIET TERRITORIES ADJACENT TO GREECE AND TURKEY, THEY WOULD CONSTITUTE AN ADDITIONAL THREAT TO THESE NATO FLANK COUNTRIES, WHILE ON THE OTHER HAND MBFR WILL NOT AFFECT NATO FORCES IN THE SOUTHERN REGION.

THEREFORE THIS UNILATERAL INCREASE IN THREAT WILL JUSTIFY THE EFFORTS OF THE ALLIANCE TO OBTAIN APPLICATION OF UNILATERAL CONSTRAINTS ON SUCH SOVIET FORCES.

125. IN THE SUBSEQUENT PARAGRAPHS OF THIS SECTION WE DISCUSS THE MOVEMENT REQUIREMENTS OF NATO FORCES IN GREECE AND TURKEY, THE APPLICABILITY OF THE MOVEMENT CONSTRAINT OPTIONS LISTED IN ANNEX 1, THE VERIFICATION MEASURES THAT MIGHT BE NEEDED, THE APPLICABILITY OF THESE OPTIONS TO THE WARSAW PACT AND CONCLUDE WITH SOME GENERAL DEDUCTIONS ABOUT THE VALUE OF THESE MEASURES TO NATO. WE ASSUME THAT CONSTRAINTS MEASURES WOULD BE APPLICABLE TO ALL USSR TERRITORY WEST OF THE URALS AND SOUTH OF THE 50TH PARALLEL AND TO ADDITIONAL NATO FOREIGN FORCES INTO GREECE AND TURKEY, (SEE MAP AT ANNEX 2). IT IS UNLIKELY THAT THE ARGUMENTS USED IN THESE PARAGRAPHS WOULD DIFFER MUCH IF THE CHOSEN PARALLEL IN THE USSR WAS ALTERED.

MOVEMENT REQUIREMENTS OF INDIGENOUS NATO FORCES
"WITHIN" GREECE AND TURKEY

126. THE GREEK AND TURKISH AUTHORITIES MADE IT CLEAR THAT THERE MUST BE FREEDOM OF MOVEMENTS FOR THEIR OWN FORCES. THIS MEANS THAT THE PROPOSED CONSTRAINTS OF ANNEX 1, PARAGRAPHS 3(A) AND 4(A) ARE UNACCEPTABLE TO GREECE AND TURKEY.

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MOVEMENT REQUIREMENTS OF EXTERNAL NATO FORCES "INTO"
GREECE AND TURKEY

127. IN PEACETIME CONDITIONS FOR EXERCISE PURPOSES AND IN TIMES OF INCREASED TENSION EXTERNAL FORCES UP TO 4 BRIGADES(1) MIGHT UNDER CURRENT PLANS BE DEPLOYED INTO THESE COUNTRIES AS FOLLOWS:

UP TO 4 BRIGADES(1)(2), MOVEMENT COMPLETED WITHIN 23 DAYS.

DEDUCTIONS FROM PARAGRAPHS 123 THROUGH 127

128. THERE MUST BE FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT FOR GREEK AND TURKISH INDIGENOUS FORCES. NATO WILL WISH TO BE FREE TO INTRODUCE EXTERNAL FORCES INTO GREECE AND TURKEY UP TO 4 BRIGADES IN PEACETIME OR IN A PERIOD OF INCREASED TENSION.

129. AS FAR AS SOVIET FORCES LOCATED IN THE REGION ARE CONCERNED, NATO WOULD WISH TO BE INFORMED OF THE PURPOSE AND DETAILS OF MOVEMENTS OF ANY SOVIET FORCES OF BRIGADE SIZE OR GREATER WITHIN THE AREA DESCRIBED IN PARAGRAPH 125 ABOVE. IT SHOULD, HOWEVER, BE KEPT IN MIND THAT RECIPROCITY IN THIS ASPECT IS UNACCEPTABLE TO GREECE AND TURKEY.

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MOVEMENT CONSTRAINTS OPTIONS

130. MOST OF THE SOVIET FORCES WHICH ARE LIKELY TO BE USED INITIALLY IN ANY ATTACK ON GREECE OR TURKEY ARE ALREADY LOCATED IN SOUTHERN USSR. THE AIMS OF ANY MOVEMENT CONSTRAINTS AGREEMENT FOR THIS REGION SHOULD BE, THEREFORE, TO DETER THE MOVEMENT OF USSR FORCES FROM OTHER PARTS OF THE USSR INTO THE AREA OF THE 50TH PARALLEL AND TO DETER THE MOVE OF FORCES ALREADY IN THAT AREA OUT OF THE USSR IN A SOUTHERLY DIRECTION. EITHER OF THE SETS OF MOVEMENT CONSTRAINTS ILLUSTRATED IN ANNEX 1 (SUITABLY MODIFIED TO CATER FOR THE DECREASED NUMBER OF EXTERNAL NATO FORCES INVOLVED IN THIS REGION) WOULD SECURE THE FIRST OF THESE AIMS BUT NEITHER WOULD MEET THE SECOND REQUIREMENT.

131. THE SUBOGROUP IS OF THE OPINION THAT THE SECOND SET OF CONSTRAINTS LISTED IN PARAGRAPH 10 OF THE REPORT AC/276-D(72)4(3) WOULD BE PREFERABLE FOR THE SOUTHERN REGION BECAUSE THEY RESTRICT THE INTRODUCTION OF UNITS FROM OUTSIDE THE CONSTRAINTS AREA ON A PERMANENT BASIS WITHOUT A COMPENSATING WITHDRAWAL OF EQUIVALENT UNITS. IN THE LIGHT OF PARAGRAPHS 126 THROUGH 130, THE CONSTRAINTS PROPOSED FOR THE SOUTHERN REGION BASED ON PRESENT NATO REQUIREMENTS (SEE PARAGRAPH 127) AND ALLOWING FOR POSSIBLE FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS, COULD BE:

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(A) MOVEMENTS WITHIN GREECE, TURKEY AND THE USSR
SOUTH OF THE 50TH PARALLEL.

NO LIMITATIONS.

(B) MOVEMENTS INTO GREECE, TURKEY AND THE USSR SOUTH
OF THE 50TH PARALLEL

TEMPORARY REINFORCEMENT OF:

UP TO 1 BRIGADE/REGT. - NOTIFICATION AT START OF MOVEMENT

MORE THAN 1 UP TO 6

BDES/REGTS. - NOTIFICATION 3 DAYS IN ADVANCE(4)

MORE THAN 6 BDES/REGTS. - PROHIBITED

MILITARY TRANSPORT A/ - NO LIMITATIONS.

THIS MEANS THAT WHEN 1 BRIGADE/REGIMENT HAS ALREADY BEEN
INTRODUCED INTO THE PROPOSED AREAS EACH UNIT ENTERING SUB-
SEQUENTLY FROM THE OUTSIDE WILL BRING THE TOTAL REINFORCEMENT
ABOVE 1 BDE/REGT. AND OUGHT TO BE NOTIFIED 3 DAYS IN ADVANCE.
SIMILARLY, WHEN THE TOTAL REINFORCEMENT HAS REACHED THE AMOUNT
OF 6 BDES/REGTS., NO MORE UNITS ARE ALLOWED TO ENTER THE
PROPOSED AREAS.

(C) MOVEMENTS OUT OF THE USSR SOUTH OF 50TH PARALLEL INTO
ROMANIA AND BULGARIA

PROHIBITED.

VERIFICATION MEASURES

132. AS EXPLAINED IN CHAPTER III, PARAGRAPH 35, THE USE OF
OBSERVERS IN THE PROPOSED USSR AREA COULD HAVE MILITARY
ADVANTAGES TO NATO.

CONCLUSION: VALUE TO NATO OF MOVEMENT CONSTRAINTS IN THE
SOUTHERN REGION

133. CONSTRAINTS MEASURES AS LISTED IN PARAGRAPH 132 COULD
HELP SERVE THE PURPOSES DESCRIBED IN PARAGRAPH 102. AN INSPECTED
MOVEMENT CONSTRAINTS AGREEMENT - WHICH COULD HAVE MILITARY AS WELL
AS POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE TO NATO - SEEMS UNACCEPTABLE TO THE COUN-
TRIES CONCERNED.

AN UNINSPECTED AGREEMENT MIGHT HAVE SOME POLITICAL VALUE AS
A CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURE, BUT WOULD HAVE NO REAL MILITARY
SIGNIFICANCE.

FOOTNOTES:

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(1) ONE AMF(L) BDE, ONE UK BDE, ONE UKJATFOR BDE, AND ONE US BDE

(2) THE STRATEGIC RESERVE (14 BRIGADES, MOVEMENT COMPLETED WITHIN
60 DAYS) IS NOT CONSIDERED IN THIS CONTEXT

(3) SEE ANNEX 1, PARAGRAPH 4

(4) INDEPENDENTLY OF THE ACTUAL TIME NEEDED FOR THE ACTIVATION

AND TRANSPORTATION OF ALL UNITS CONCERNED, THE TIME OF
NOTIFICATION IS FIXED AT 3 DAYS BEFORE THE FIRST ELEMENTS
OF THESE UNITS WILL ENTER THE CONSTRAINTS AREA

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